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Abstract—Timing attacks are a challenge for current intrusion
detection solutions. Timing attacks are dangerous for web appli-
cations because they may leak information about side channel
vulnerabilities. This paper presents a massive-multi-sensor zero-
configuration Intrusion Detection System that is especially good
at detecting timing attacks. Unlike current solutions, the proposed
Intrusion Detection System uses a huge number of sensors for
attack detection. These sensors include sensors automatically
inserted into web application or into the frameworks used
to build web applications. With this approach the Intrusion
Detection System is able to detect sophisticated attacks like timing
attacks or other brute-force attacks with increased accuracy.
The proposed massive-multi-sensor zero-configuration intrusion
detection system does not need specific knowledge about the
system to protect, hence it offers zero-configuration capability.
Index Terms—intrusion detection, sensor, brute force, timing
I. INTRODUCTION
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) in combination with
firewalls are the last defense line in security when protecting
web applications. The purpose of an IDS is to alert a human
operator or a Intrusion Prevention System that an attack is in
preparation or currently taking place. The configuration of an
IDS typically involves a configuration that must be adapted
for each system to protect. The massive-multi-sensor zero-
configuration intrusion detection system for web applications
presented in this paper (called All-Seeing Eye in the following)
does not need any adaption to the system to protect, hence is
very easy to use.
One common challenge for web applications is the detection
of timing attacks. A timing attack is an attack, which uses time
differences between different actions to gain informations.
Intrusion Detection Systems typically use sensors to collect
data. In this work, a sensor describes a data source that
provides data useful for attack detection. Useful in this context
means that the data must be linked to actions of a web
application. Data of sensors is analyzed by All-Seeing Eye to
detect attacks. Current Intrusion Detection Systems are fairly
limited in the number of sensors they use. All-Seeing Eye
increases the number of available sensors by injecting code
into common web application frameworks or even into web
applications to provide additional sensors. A further increase in
the number of sensors results from the combination of multiple
sensors into one new sensor. Sensors may collect data from
any data source available on a web server, or on the network.
Sensors include:
• Network sensors like TCP requests, or TCP flags (e.g.,
SYN or SYN/ACK) per period.
• Hardware sensors like CPU usage, memory usage, or fan
speed.
• Kernel sensors like number of file IO handles, number of
system calls, and the like.
• Software sensors like log file entries or software hooks.
• System sensors like alerts from other common Intrusion
Detections Systems, e.g., Snort [1] .
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section II
presents related work in intrusion detection using multiple
sensors. Section III describes the concept and implementation
of the sensors used by All-Seeing Eye. The use of multiple
sensors to detect intrusions is described in Section IV. Section
V evaluates All-Seeing Eye under different attacks, especially
timing attacks. Section VI concludes the paper and gives an
outlook on future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Anomaly detection is based on the hypothesis that there
are deviations between normal behaviour and behaviour un-
der intrusion [2], [3], [4], [5]. Many techniques have been
researched for the detection like network traffic analysis [6],
[7], [8], statistical analysis in records [9] or sequence analysis
with system calls [10], [11], [12], [13]. A combination of this
research with anomaly detection methods based on multiple
sensors allows to find yet unknown attacks. Configuring intru-
sion detecting systems for one distinct system or one distinct
vulnerability needs configuration with current solutions. The
SECURWARE 2013 : The Seventh International Conference on Emerging Security Information, Systems and Technologies
ar
X
iv
:1
50
6.
07
05
5v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
3 J
un
 20
15
solution presented in this paper does not need any configura-
tion.
In [11], [12], it is proved that call chains of system calls
show different behavior under normal conditions and under
intrusion, hence intrusion detection is possible. However, a
normal model must be trained using learning data to detect
attacks. In [12], it is shown that normal behaviour produces
fingerprintable signatures in system call data. A deviation
from these signatures is defined as intrusion. This method is
restricted to the usage of system calls and does not use more
fine granular sensor data. In [14], a way to detect anomalies
with information flow analysis is shown. Profiling techniques
are used, injecting small sensors in a running application. They
propose a model with clusters of allowed information flows
and compare this normal model against actual information
flow. Similar models are proposed in [15], [16], [17]. This
approach is similar to our approach, but [14] focuses on offline
audits for penetration testing. The approach presented in this
paper is intended to be used online, hence it does not analyze
the whole information flow but focuses on the method call
chain, and is therefore more efficient.
In [18], it is shown that vulnerability probing can be de-
tected using multiple sensors, especially sensor that calculate
the possibility a resource is called by a user. These sensors are
called access frequency based sensors. However, the system
presented in [18] needs a lot of information about the system
to protect (e.g., patterns describing legitimate resource calls),
hence is difficult to deploy in the field. The solution presented
in this paper does not need any configuration.
III. SENSORS FOR A MASSIVE MULTI-SENSOR
ZERO-CONFIGURATION INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM
A sensor describes a data source that provides useful data
for attack detection. Useful in this context means that the data
must be linked to actions of a web application. Data of sensors
is analyzed by the proposed Intrusion Detection System All-
Seeing Eye to detect attacks. Sensors are:
• Already available data sources like memory consumption
of an application.
• Software sensors inserted into a web application or a web
application framework.
• Advanced sensors that combine data from multiple other
sensors. Figure 1, shows an example of an advanced
sensor: sensor A and sensor B are combined into sensor
SumSensor by adding the output of sensor A and sensor
B at distinct points in time.
All-Seeing Eye depends on the availability of a large
number of sensors that can be used for attack detection.
The current implementation of All-Seeing Eye is using the
following classes of sensors:
• Alert Sensors: alert sensors have an upper and/or a lower
boundary for data measured by this sensor that triggers
an alert.
• Sensors with non-string payload:
Fig. 1: Datasource sensors and aggregation sensors
– 64 Bit payload: These sensors have a payload. The
payload typically consists of measurement values
(e.g., time differences).
– 32 Bit payload: The payload consists of four byte
and is typically used for simple state (e.g. the user
authentication state, either ”not authenticated” or
”authenticated” ).
• String Sensor: the payload of sensors of this class consists
of a simple string. This class of sensors is usually used
in regular expressions.
• Filter Sensor: a sensor of this class filters the output of
an existing sensor, e.g. by evaluating regular expressions.
• Aggregation Sensors: sensors of this class combine output
of other sensors into a new sensor. Based on the time of
aggregation, two subclasses are used:
– One-Time Aggregation Sensor: a sensor of this class
can combine values of other sensors, e.g. by addition,
multiplication or logarithmic scaling.
– Continuous Aggregation Sensor: sensors of this class
combine values of other sensors over a certain period
of time, creating an average or quantile.
The current implementation of All-Seeing Eye uses soft-
ware sensors, but the presented approach can be extended to
hardware sensors. However, hardware sensors are not within
the scope of this paper. All-Seeing Eye is intended to protect
web applications relying on the Java runtime, however, the
massive-multi-sensor zero-configuration approach may also be
adapted to other execution environments. In the following, it
is described how software sensors can be realized.
A. Sensor Implementation
Software sensors are implemented by injecting hooks at the
beginning and end of methods of a web application. Hence,
hooks are called before and after code execution of a method.
With this approach, it is e.g. possible to measure the method
execution time for each method used. It is also possible to
identify the order of method execution. Hooks are injected
directly into Java bytecode. It is not necessary to recompile any
Java web application protected by All-Seeing Eye. Deploying
All-Seeing Eye is as simple as copying the All-Seeing Eye
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jar file into the library directory of the web server. It is not
necessary to perform any configuration for the web application
that should be protected, hence All-Seeing Eye is called ”zero
configuration”. As injection technology AspectJ [19], with
Load Time Weaving [20], is used. For the testbed used for
the evaluation presented in this paper the aspect is placed in
OpenCMS [21]. OpenCMS is a well known and widely used
framework for Content Management. All-Seeing Eye takes
care that methods used by the protected web application do
not clash with method names used by All-Seeing Eye. Sensor
data is written to a log file for further analyses.
A typical software sensor will produce data as followed:
t imes tamp , count , SID , v a l u e
where Timestamp and count together form a unique ID.
Timestamp is a UNIX timestamp of the event. Count is a
counter incremented each time adding a SID to a timestamp
with at least one SID at the same timestamp. V alues is the
sensor value. SID is a unique key describing one sensor in
this format:
package . c l a s s . method . i d . v i d . vv id
where package is the package in which the class is located
in which the method is situated that was injected for this
sensor. Id is used to distinguish overloaded methods from
each other. V id identifies a type of the value (e.g., String),
and vvid is an additional sensor for further use (e.g., if two
sensors are injected into the same method).
A software sensor is unique with
package . c l a s s . method . i d . v i d . vv id
One way to minimize the output of sensors (and the number
of data to write to the log file) is to produce no output for
methods that have an execution time lower than the resolution
of the timestamps (1 ms). It is suspected that these methods
would not generate any interesting output as these methods
are usually helper methods or wrappers.
B. Memory Consumption and Computational Overhead of the
Proposed Multi-Sensor Approach
Software sensors have an impact on memory consumption
of the protected web application. An additional 30 byte code
operation are added to each method call of the web application
by All-Seeing Eyes. Hence, the percentage of computational
overhead heavily depends on the length of the methods of the
web application.
In the testbed using OpenCMS (see Section V), the follow-
ing experiment was conducted to evaluate the memory and
computation overhead:
10,000 requests are sent to a web application using All-
Seeing Eye. 100 runs were used, resetting the server after
each run. Figure 2 shows the average memory consumption
from 100 runs of the experiment compared to the memory
consumption from 100 runs of the web application without
All-Seeing Eye. It can be seen that a significant overhead of
approximately 300 MB is needed to run All-Seeing Eye. This
overhead is the result of buffering data before writing to the
log files.
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Fig. 2: Memory comsumption of All-Seeing Eye
IV. MASSIVE MULTI-SENSOR ZERO-CONFIGURATION
INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM
This Section describes the design of the proposed massive
multi-sensor zero-configuration intrusion detection system All-
Seeing Eye. All-Seeing Eye uses the software sensors, de-
scribed in more detail in the last section, to calculate intrusion
metrics. The metrics described in the following are focused
on detection of outliers in timeline data values to detect brute
force attacks. However, the approach presented in this paper
is not limited to this attack class, it can be easily adapted
to detect various other attacks. Even attacks on the business
logic can be detected as the presented approach uses software
sensors embedded in the code of an application. This is out
of scope of this paper.
An advantage of All-Seeing Eye is that it allows to detect
side channel attacks without knowledge of the web application
which is to be protected. In the absence of an attack, there is
a high correlation between method calls defined in a method
chain. As shown in Section V a single call results in correlated
calls (method chain) of other methods. The system under load
shows the same correlations. These correlations are further
called as fingerprint s. Under attack, however, the system
shows a different behavior, hence allows to identify attacks,
see Section V for details. All-Seeing Eye does not need a
preconfigured or constructed normal model. For this approach
the normal model is created from history. At time t = 0 it
is always assumed that there is no attack, hence status c is
always c! = attack. If there is no attack, the same fingerprint
s should show up in each distinct time period T with the
same probability. A deviation from the number of fingerprings
(written as |s|) in a time period T is defined as possible
intrusion. This behaviour is well known, as stated in Section
II. The new approach here is the lack of need to define what a
similar request is. The normal model is built using a quantile
function, where the result is called α. α uses a floating history
time period, which is defined as n× T and t ∈ T are in state
c! = attack.The multiplier n defines how much of the history
is used. To control the sensitivity of the system, a configuration
parameter p is used. In normal model α, a deviation is detected
by:
c =
{
attack if |scurrentT | ≥ α× p
!attack if |scurrentT | < α× p
(1)
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This calculation is robust against statistical outliers and can
be evaluated fast enough for real time calculation, in combi-
nation with structures related to sort optimisation. In further
researches these calculations will be done (together with other
sensor calculations) with a graphical processing unit.
V. EVALUATION
For the evaluation of the massive multi-sensor zero-
configuration intrusion detection system, two typical attacks
on web applications are used: timing attacks and vulnerability
probing. Especially timing attacks are hard to detect for
common intrusion detection systems. For our test environment
OpenCMS version 8.5.1 [21] is used as web application to pro-
tect. OpenCMS is a well known and widely used framework
for Content Management.
A. Evaluation Environment
For the evaluation of All-Seeing Eye, a paravirtualized,
openvz solution [22] is used. This approach has the advantage
that is is very realistic compared to simulations. The presented
hardware settings are the settings of the corresponding virtual
machine. Table I lists hardware and software used for the
evaluation.
TABLE I: Experimental setup
Hardware(Server)
CPU 4 Cores (2.1GHZ on hostsystem)
Memory 6 GB Ram
Ethernet Bridged at 1 GBit Nic
Software(Server)
Server Version Apache Tomcat 7.0.28 [23]
JVM Sun 1.6.0.27-b27
B. Fingerprints of Normal Behaviour
To validate the hypothesis, that requests to the same target
have the same fingerprint, the following experiment has been
conducted.
First, a baseline is established for all other experiments. To
do so, several requests are sent to the server and the server
is restarted after each request. No interfering processes are
running on this server.
After establishing the baseline, the whole website is crawled
in a second step, ensuring that requests are sequential. The
crawler is configured to request a single page and all depend-
ing images and scripts. To test the software under load in
the third step, another crawler requests the server with 20
concurrent users, with a delay of one second between each
request/user. Overall there were in average 20 requests per
second for different websites. The second and third step have
been repeated 100 times. In each run of the experiment, the
metrics described above produced unique fingerprints for every
requested target. This can be seen in Figure 3. In this figure the
fingerprint of the start page and the request to the login page
are extracted from the logged data. Under load the signature
looks like the picture presented in Figure 4.
The result in Figure 3 shows that there are stable correla-
tions between method calls. For better readability, points that
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 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 200000  300000  400000  500000  600000
 0
 50
 100
 150
 200
 250
 300
 350
 400
du
ra
tio
n 
in
 m
illi
se
co
nd
m
e
th
od
ca
lls
 p
er
 s
ec
on
d
millisecond
Measurement opencms 100 req
calls/sec
duration ms
Fig. 4: 100 requests on the same page
differ less then 3 milliseconds are averaged. The experiments
show that it is possible with All-Seeing Eye to identify similar
requests using their fingerprint.
C. Fingerprints of Information Leakage and Probing for Vul-
nerabilities
OpenCMS version 8.5.1 has a known information leakage
vulnerability, as described in [24]: using the default setting
there is no limit for failed logins per time period. Also, a large
amount of information is given in error messages, especially
the error message ”this username is unknown”, if the given
user name does not exist and ”password is wrong”, if the given
password is wrong for an existing user allow an attacker to
find valid user names, by trying possible user names from
a dictionary and using error messages to find out if an user
name is valid. This attack can be detected with a statistical
analysis to detect the brute force analysis II. To do so, a
detection technique needs to identify if a single resource is
called many times but with different parameter in the request
header. A normal model is needed for allowing patterns to
test for deviations of the normal model. This needs deep
knowledge of the system to protect and the vulnerability itself.
All-Seeing Eye is able to detect this attack (and also other
probings using brute force attacks), without this knowledge
about system and vulnerability.
To evaluate if All-Seeing Eye can recognize brute-force
attacks, an experiment has been conducted where an attacker
probes the login page and tries to identify valid user names.
The following pattern was used to generate the login requests:
\ p r o t e c t \ v r u l e w i d t h 0 p t \ p r o t e c t \ h r e f { h t t p
: / / 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 2 . 8 9 : 8 0 8 0 / opencms / . . . / i n d e x . h tml ?
a c t i o n = l o g i n }{ h t t p : / / 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 2 . 8 9 : 8 0 8 0 / opencms
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in on the start page
/ . . . / i n d e x . h tml ? a c t i o n = l o g i n}&username =
username 1&password = p a s s w o r d n o t i n d b . . . sn ippedEnd
/ / username 1 . . username n i n d i c t i o n a r y
\ p r o t e c t \ v r u l e w i d t h 0 p t \ p r o t e c t \ h r e f { h t t p
: / / 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 2 . 8 9 : 8 0 8 0 / opencms / . . . / i n d e x . h tml ?
a c t i o n = l o g i n }{ h t t p : / / 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 2 . 8 9 : 8 0 8 0 / opencms
/ . . . / i n d e x . h tml ? a c t i o n = l o g i n}&username =
username n&password = p a s s w o r d n o t i n d b . . . sn ippedEnd
The attacker used a dictionary with 1000 names for the
brute-force attack. To make detection harder, the attacker uses
50 different user agents as well as 20 different IPs. Only one
valid username exists in the database.
Figure 4 shows a subset of 100 requests. From the figure
it is obvious, that the probing attemps produce many similar
fingerprints. It shows a high correlation between different
requests, the sensor values and the order different sensors are
called in one requests. This order and the values are stable
over all requests. Hence, All-Seeing Eyes can easily detect a
probing attack even if someone uses different header data. No
a-priori knowledge of the system which is to be protected or
the vulnerability itself is necessary.
D. Fingerprints of Timing attacks
OpenCMS version 8.5.1 is vulnerable to timing attacks as
can be seen in Figure 5. The figure shows the times for loading
of the start page for users that are already logged in as well as
for users that are not logged in. A significant difference (849
ms to 798 ms) exists.
Using this timing difference an attacker can brute force
user names by a dictionary attack. All logged in users can be
detected. As with the information leakage and probing attack
in Subsection V-C, current intrusion detection solutions need
information about the system which is to be protected and the
vulnerability to detect this attack.
To test if All-Seeing Eye is able to detect timing attacks
without knowledge (zero-Configuration), the following exper-
iment has been conducted: An attacker uses a dictionary of
1000 user names to execute the timing attack. Each request
has different header data in the request only in the login name
and the password as shown in following listing:
/ / s u c c e s s f u l l o g i n
\ p r o t e c t \ v r u l e w i d t h 0 p t \ p r o t e c t \ h r e f { h t t p
: / / 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 2 . 8 9 : 8 0 8 0 / opencms / . . . / i n d e x . h tml ?
a c t i o n = l o g i n }{ h t t p : / / 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 2 . 8 9 : 8 0 8 0 / opencms
/ . . . / i n d e x . h tml ? a c t i o n = l o g i n}&username =admin98&
password =admin1 . . . sn ippedEnd
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Fig. 6: 100 requests on the same page
/ / username n o t p r e s e n t , pwd n o t p r e s e n t
\ p r o t e c t \ v r u l e w i d t h 0 p t \ p r o t e c t \ h r e f { h t t p
: / / 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 2 . 8 9 : 8 0 8 0 / opencms / . . . / i n d e x . h tml ?
a c t i o n = l o g i n }{ h t t p : / / 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 2 . 8 9 : 8 0 8 0 / opencms
/ . . . / i n d e x . h tml ? a c t i o n = l o g i n}&username =
u s e r n a m e n o t p r e s e n t&password =wrongpwd . . .
sn ippedEnd
/ / username p r e s e n t w i th wrong password
\ p r o t e c t \ v r u l e w i d t h 0 p t \ p r o t e c t \ h r e f { h t t p
: / / 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 2 . 8 9 : 8 0 8 0 / opencms / . . . / i n d e x . h tml ?
a c t i o n = l o g i n }{ h t t p : / / 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 2 . 8 9 : 8 0 8 0 / opencms
/ . . . / i n d e x . h tml ? a c t i o n = l o g i n}&username =admin832&
password =wrongpwd . . . sn ippedEnd
Figure 6 shows an examples of a fingerprints of the ex-
periment. The first fingerprint shows a successful login, the
second fingerprint shows a login with no present username
and third fingerprint shows a login with present username
but wrong password. The results clearly show a correlation
of the differences in order, time, and amount of method calls
for each request. The presence of unusual high amount of
similar fingerprints in a distinct time period allows to detect
this timing attack. Hence, All-Seeing Eye can identify timing
attacks.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presented the massive-multi-sensore zero-
configuration intrusion detection solution All-Seeing Eye. All-
Seeing Eye uses multiple software sensors for attack detection.
Software sensors are automatically injected into web applica-
tions to protect. No change to deployed web applications is
necessary and All-Seeing Eye does not need to be configured
for each web application. All-Seeing Eye is zero-configuration.
The evaluation showed that brute force attacks, e.g. timing
attacks, can be detected by All-Seeing Eye using fingerprints
automatically generated. It also shows that it is possible to
identify similar requests without knowledge over the system
or the definition of patterns. The current version of All-Seeing
Eye produces a memory overhead of approximately 300 MB,
which will be reduced in future versions using Graphical
Processing Units (GPU) for fast calculation, reducing the need
to write data to log files. This will also increase the amount of
possible sensors, which can be calulated near real time. Further
work will target different attacks like Blind SQL-injection,
CSRF attacks, XSS attacks, and Command Injection.
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